---
title: "A correctly run ceremony for an unsound setup protocol"
description: "Every operational control works — diverse participants, verified contributions, published transcript, beacon — and the parameters are still unsound, because…"
type: "failure-mode"
url: "https://zkpick.com/ceremony/failure-modes/a-correctly-run-ceremony-for-an-unsound-setup-protocol/"
section: "04 Running or reusing a trusted setup"
authors:
  - "MarketComp"
publisher: "MarketComp"
version: "1.3"
updated: "2026-09-12"
license: "CC-BY-4.0"
json: "https://zkpick.com/data/ceremony/failure-modes/a-correctly-run-ceremony-for-an-unsound-setup-protocol.json"
---

*By MarketComp. Updated 2026-09-12. Version 1.3. CC BY 4.0.*

# A correctly run ceremony for an unsound setup protocol

Every operational control works — diverse participants, verified contributions, published transcript, beacon — and the parameters are still unsound, because the setup *protocol* published an element it should not have. This has happened: a flaw in an early pairing-based construction's parameter generation allowed unlimited undetectable counterfeiting and went unnoticed for years. No amount of ceremony hygiene addresses it.

**Mitigation:** Have the setup construction itself reviewed as cryptography, separately from the ceremony's operation — see [§03](https://zkpick.com/audit/). Prefer constructions with multiple independent implementations and published security proofs over bespoke or modified parameter generation.